South Africa Must Build Faster
Corruption and incompetence are a global government phenomenon, but there is something particularly special about South Africa’s brand of inadequacy.
Three countries want to build a highway: Germany, the USA and South Africa. Germany claims they will need two years to build the highway. They build it in one, under budget and with good quality. The USA takes a bit longer and goes a little over budget. But the highway is built. South Africa, on the other hand, goes way over budget, and if the highway is ever completed at all, it takes years past the initial deadline.
This is just a common joke, but it is indicative of the dire straits of South Africa’s public works.
Corruption and incompetence are a global government phenomenon, but there is something particularly special about South Africa’s brand of inadequacy.
In Cape Town’s Southern Suburbs, some major suburban arteries are being “upgraded” to absorb new MyCiti bus lanes and public transport infrastructure. The project has already been ongoing for well over 250 days (as of writing), with little progress, and work is planned to finish in 2027. This is likely optimistic, as 83% of public works projects in South Africa are completed late or never, with an average delay of almost three years.
Capetonians will no doubt remember the Kalk Bay roadworks, that took nine years to eventually complete.
Already, the MyCiti project along Imam Haron and Stanhope bridge is being granted 33 months to complete a quite rudimentary civil engineering job that should take no longer than 18 – 24 months. But at the pace of work, this time will no doubt increase.
A handful of workers pick lazily at the ground, while barriers blockade small businesses and roadworks congest traffic, forcing cars down narrow suburban streets. There is no sense of urgency, even while cafes and shops have already needed to shut down due to the drop in customers, as parking has been replaced by ditches and barricades and even foot traffic is unable to enter many places of business.
A bus route to this area will likely improve commerce in the long run. But at what expense in the meanwhile? Extra customers after 2027 (and likely only over 2030) will not help the cafes and shops having to shut down now.
The frustrating fact of the matter is that the work doesn’t need to be this slow. Yet, red-tape, tendering problems, corruption, construction mafias, bad planning and general government incompetence ensures that it goes as slowly as possible.
In the case of this project, and many like it across South Africa, the work areas remain unnecessarily idle for far too long. Weeks have gone by without a single worker being seen onsite. Often, the only workers present are dead-eyed flag wavers doing the job of an already existing and functioning intersection.
Public works are cited by many as being a job programme, yet only very few workers are actually onsite, and a minority of them are actually working. The goal should never be to maximise job. The goal should be to maximise productivity and value. Job creation follows value creation and leads to more opportunities overall.
Yet, public works in South Africa fail both tests.
When workers are present, it is often only a handful. And of this handful, only a single worker will be active at any time. It is no exaggeration to say that for all dozen workers present, only one will be working while others are “supervising” said worker.
Slackers need to be held accountable and stringent labour regulations that prevent the firing of slackers need to be abolished. If a worker is not fulfilling their job, they have no business receiving a paycheque. On top of this, there is no logical reason why only a few square metres must be worked on at a time. If the project allows, as much the work must be done in parallel at the same time. This allows the work to be completed faster and leads to opportunities for more workers to be employed.
Unfortunately, lazy workers, corrupt tenderpreneurs and swathes of officials have a built-in incentive to let projects run over time so they can continue cashing monthly checks. This perverse incentive must end. The solution is, wherever possible, to implement incentives to complete projects timeously. Either bonuses for completed work of a satisfactory quality within a reasonable timeframe or only paying contractors when a particular phase of work has been completed.
If South Africa wants better infrastructure, it must stop pretending that slow, bloated, endlessly delayed public works are inevitable. They are not. They are a choice, made every day through weak accountability, perverse incentives, and an acceptance of mediocrity as normal. Roads do not take years to build because physics demands it. They take years because nobody is punished for failure and nobody is rewarded for efficiency.
Until public works are treated as projects that must deliver value, rather than vehicles for patronage, box-ticking and indefinite employment, nothing will change. Communities will continue to be strangled by half-finished roads, small businesses will continue to die behind barricades, and taxpayers will continue to fund failure. South Africa does not lack engineers, skills or capital. It lacks urgency, discipline and consequences. And until those are restored, every new “upgrade” will simply become another long-running joke at the public’s expense.
Nicholas Woode-Smith is the Managing Editor of the Rational Standard. He is a senior associate of the Free Market Foundation and writes in his personal capacity.



Nicholas, from many years of experience in the trenches of the govermentally financed Expanded Public Works Programme, I can confirm what you wrote. I can even add some more nightmarerish facts about that massively ineffective programme, as I experienced it personally.
Firtsly, projects are often selected with a political or self-enrichment purpose in mind, which most of the time coincide. The most pressing and deserving projects are thus often not chosen, since they do not meet the unspoken criteria of being primarilly aimed at enriching some cadres and their hangers-on.
From there it goes all the way downwards. A so-called implementing agent or agency is chosen in line with the real motivation behind the project, as stated above. Merit is not much of a consideration. On the contrary, incompetent and manipulatable agents or agencies are preferred, as long as they are willing to feed their political master.
Then comes the implementation of the project which is preceded by appointing a contractor or contractors. Predictably, they need to be the "right" ones, irrespective of what they will cost the project. They in turn must then select workers from the local community using a biased selection process which will ensure that the loyal ones are chosen.
It goes without saying that the contractors are also expected to buy materials from the "right" suppliers, never mind price-competiveness.
Thereafter the project is managed in such a way that it defies all measures of productivity: believe it or not, but contractors and workers are ecouraged, almost forced, to work as slowly as possible. The reason being that the project must primarilly show how many people were employed for how long, since that is the main "success factor" against which a project is measured at "completion", which it seldom is.
"Projects" are known on which millions were spent, without the projects even existing. Many others end up only partially completed. But "completion reports" are of course created which may or may not point out the failures of the project - or which reports try to put a positive spin on the failed project results.
Afterwards, nothing further is heard about the whole abortion, which was supposed to be a developmental project, which actually should have added something tangible towards the improvement of a usually very poor community's wellbeing. The workers then more often than not go sit along the streets again without jobs, since no sustainable development was brought about.
All of above is then followed by a repeat cycle of similar "projects"...
The perverse incentive structure is key here. When contractors and officials benefit from delays, efficiency becomes a liability not an asset. The observation about parallel work being avoided is spot-on, I've seen road projects drag on when simultaneous work sections would slash timelines. Bonuses for early quality completion flips the incentiv structure completley. Thats where change actually happens, not in more oversight.